Eleven years after Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, Spain's position vis-à-vis Kosovo has not only not varied, but it has become stronger, turning Madrid into the leader of the Kosovo non recognizers club within the EU. This paper analyses Kosovo-Spain relations in the last eleven years. More specifically, the paper examines the reasons behind the non-recognition of Kosovo and the approach of the Spanish governments toward Kosovo's statehood. This is followed 
Introduction
The Spanish governments' involvement in the political development of the Western Balkans (WB) has always been marked by an absence of commercial trade, that has naturally resulted in a lack of interest and in the absence of a foreign policy agenda in the region. Kosovo-Spain relations in the last twenty-five years -first, as a province of Serbia and then as an independent state -has followed this line, although the relations between the two deteriorated with the unilateral declaration of independence (hereinafter "UDI") of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. Prior to that, Spain had followed the main EU foreign policy agenda in the WB, supporting the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the establishment of UNMIK and providing later on a contingent of Spanish soldiers to the NATO mission in Kosovo (KFOR) (Pouw, 2016, 35 ).
Kosovo's UDI broke with the detachment of the Spanish governments towards the development of the WB and turned the non-recognition of Kosovo (hereinafter "the Kosovo question") into a state matter. Since then, the position of Spain vis-à-vis Kosovo became very rigid: from implementing a strong visa regime that alienated Kosovan citizens to enter Spain, to ban Kosovo national symbols in multiple sports events, being the 2018 World Karate Championship the latest one of these senseless events (Morina 2018) . This paper aims to understand these political decisions, examining the Spain-Kosovo relations throughout the last eleven years. By the same token, the first part of the paper sheds light into the question of non-recognition by Spain.
Although many analysts and media outlets have indicated that Spain does not recognise Kosovo due to the territorial dynamics of the countryCatalonia and the Basque Country -, the Spanish government argues that its position is not based on the internal power struggle of Spain. They state, however, that they do not recognize Kosovo's independence because its UDI was a breach of international law. Against this position, it is argued that the internal situation of Spain played a major role; however, the adherence to international law and the internal dynamics of the Spanish Socialist party in power during Kosovo's UDI had also a distinctive role in shaping Madrid's position.
The second part of the paper focuses on Catalan separatism' usage of Kosovo's UDI and how it helped the central government in Madrid not only not to recognise Kosovo, but to deteriorate the relations with the former Serbian province. Although pressure existed from Basque separatism likewise, the research focuses primarily in the Catalan side.
Furthermore, the paper looks at the role of Kosovo's path for selfdetermination in the Catalan path for independence and how Catalan separatism misused Kosovo's UDI to further their own path to break-up with Spain. Finally, the last part concludes, stating that, all in all, Catalonia and the Basque country are the major reasons not to recognise Kosovo and that Kosovo's UDI was perceived as a model by Catalan separatism in their quest for independence.
The methodology of this paper is based on a qualitative approach. The documentation has mainly been gathered through desk-research and semi-structured interviews, being political statements, policy papers, media press releases and government motions the major data sources of the research. This has been complemented by semi-structured interviews (Perritt, 2010, 136) , that could create and important precedent and have major implications for the Catalan and Basque's wills for independence (International Crisis Group 2007, 10 Affairs of Spain, raised this fear, stating that "Kosovo would be an elections issue", as it was "in the headlines, and the debate in Europe (was) drawing the government's attention away from its campaign priorities" (Pouw, 2016, 45) .
In this complex environment, Kosovo's UDI developed into a threat for the PSOE in power, that witnessed how the Catalan and Basque nationalists and PP's pressure on the Kosovo question could affect the socialists' governability of Spain. This concern had even led Moratinos to ask the authorities in Pristina to postpone the declaration until after the general elections, albeit with little success (Reuters 18 Feb. 2008 From there on, the Spanish government continued to follow a very inconsistent approach, as their representatives started labelling Kosovo as a "sui generis case", but simultaneously, they reaffirmed Kosovo's unilateral path was setting a precedent for other nations' will for independence (Leon Gross, 2008) . This conflicting approach was driven by the fear that the Catalan and Basque separatists would instrumentalize Kosovo's UDI to potentially follow the same path. In an unforeseen manner, and driven by the lack of congruity, Kosovo's non-recognition gave the Catalan separatists a window of opportunity to create a (faulty) parallelism between the two cases, provoking the entrenchment of the Spanish position. In the aftermath of the ICJ judgment, Spain thus lost the momentum to recognize Kosovo and assert once and for all that the situation of Kosovo had nothing in common with the internal dynamics of Spain. In the foreseeable future, it is very unlikely that the government of Spain will change its position vis-à-vis Kosovo, regardless of the government in power. Both the PP and the PSOE -parties in power for the last thirty years -have shown that the Kosovo question is a state matter, that will remain unaltered as long as Serbia and Kosovo do not achieve a mutual agreement, by which the former recognizes Kosovo as an independent state. Furthermore, Spain's approach will most likely continue to lay in the strong line of non-recognizers, as there is no likelihood that the Spanish position will dissociate Kosovo from the internal situation in Spain; and being the crisis in Catalonia still high and persistent, no change in Madrid's policy vis-à-vis Kosovo is foreseen. 
